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1. Introduction
This essay deals with the appropriate use of economic models in
antitrust analysis, It does not attempt a comprehensive treatment,
Rather, after a few general remarks, some aspects of this broad issue
are illustrated through consideration of economic issues arising in the
Federal Trade ComissionTs recent proceeding involving Borden's Realemon
Foods subdivision.
If antitrust is to be concerned, at least in part, with efficient
2
resource use, any judgement, whether by court or commentator, that some
action should be found unlawful or some relief imposed in any particular
case must be based, at least in part, on some explicit or implicit model
that predicts the economic effects of the action or relief considered.
Unless economic efficiency is held to be of no importance, one can no
more avoid the use of economic models in this context than one can avoid
speaking prose. One can, of course, use an unsound or inappropriate model.
I hope to indicate that this is most likely to happen when the model
selection problem is either ignored or treated as if it can be solved by
the application of simple rules of thumb.
If a model is to be used to make predictions about economic effects,
it ought to be internally coherent, inthe sense that its predictions can
be correctly deduced from its assumptions, and consistent with the general
principles of economic analysis. It has often been noted that some economic
models regularly used by the courts fail this basic test.3 Further, the
model's predictions should not conflict in important ways with the facts
at hand. If enough data of the right sort are available, or if controlled
r.
experimentation is possible, one can in principle select the best among
a set of competing models entirely on the basis of the accuracy of their
predictions, But in the analysis of individual markets that is at the
heart of antitrust, this is not always feasible, Under both monopoly and
competition, for instance, profits can be high in the short run, cost
increases can produce price increases, and, except in the limiting case of
pure competition, advertising can occur, If definitive model selection
on the basis of prediction accuracy alone is impossible, one has little
choice but to look at the assumptions on which competing models rest,
A model with assumptions that are in dramatic conflict with the relevant
facts ought to be rejected as a basis for decision-making if its predictions
cannot be shown to be inferior to those of a competing model with more
plausible assumptions.
Over the years, economic. theorists have produced a large number
of models of market behavior, The principles and methods employed in
these studies can be used to produce new models, either designed for
general application to some class of situations or tailored to fit the facts
of a particular case. The industrial organization literature contains
another set of models, These often have their roots in rigorous micro-
economic theory, but many depend as much on empirical generalizations of
various sorts, The classical models of competition and monopoly are now
only two of a large number of more or less respectable economic models that
can potentially be used to inform antitrust policy. To limit attention
to these two models, or to attempt to go beyond them without explicitly
considering the criteria of the preceding paragraph, may be to run the
III
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risk of significant error,
The size of this risk must, of course, vary from case to case,
Areeda (1974, p, 5) may be correct when he asserts that ",,, the economic
background needed for understanding antitrust issues seldom requires
detailed mastery of economic refinements," Even if this is right, however,
it is not clear how one without such "detailed mastery" can recognize the
exceptional cases, let alone deal adequately with them,
It would thus be useful to have a set of tests for distinguishing
between (a) cases that can probably be adequately analyzed by straightforward
organization
application of the tools given in basic price theory and industrialAtexts
and (b) cases in which the model selection problem is likely to be suffi-
ciently difficult as to require explicit comparison of competing theoretical
models. Adequate analysis of cases in class (b) may entail heavy reliance
on the principles and methods of economic theory and, possibly, the creation
and evaluation of new economic models. (It is, after all, somewhat optimistic
to suppose that currently-available models will be able to answer all future
questions, so that no more work on the theory of markets will ever be
necessary.)
I do not know if it is possible to sort cases into these two classes
without "detailed mastery of economic refinements" and detailed knowledge
of the facts nyolved, In any event, I have no simple, general tests to
propose. But elementary logic does indicate that the more the facts in
any particular case depart from the assumptions of textbook microeconomics,
the less likely it must become that the textbook models are adequate or
that choice among them will be easy, In particular, textbook. price theory
-4-
assumes that markets are well-defined, that buyers and sellers are
perfectly informed, and, generally, that the offerings of competing
sellers are viewed by buyers as perfect substitutes, When substitution
relations are such that there is no object that corresponds exactly to
the classical concept of a market, when buyers or sellers lack important
information, or when product differentiation of one form or another is
present, there is at least a presumption that market behavior may not
be well explained by standard models. This does not imply that no
economic model can be employed; as was pointed out above, the necessity
to reach conclusions means that some model must be used explicitly or
implicitly, It does imply that the task of selecting an appropriate
model is likely to be difficult and, if the best model is not
of the elementary textbook variety, application of that model is likely
to require some knowledge of the "refinements" of economic theory.
In what follows, I attempt to illustrate some of these points
through an analysis of the economics of a specific recent antitrust
decision: the Initial Decision of Federal Trade Commission Administrative
Law Judge Daniel H, Hanscom, which concluded that Borden's Realemon Foods
subdivision had monopolized the processed lemon juice market.5 The next
Section outlines the apparent facts of the case.6 Sections 3 - 5 consider
three issues of importance in that case and in others: market definition
and its role in the analysis of market power, tests for predatory pricing,
and the design of relief, Section 6 provides a few summary remarks.
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2. The Realemon Case
In 1935, Irvin Swartzberg began bottling lemon juice in his basement and
selling it in Chicago. 7 He began using the "Realemon" trademark in the mid-
1940's. The business grew rapidly, and in 1962 Swartzberg's company, Realemon-
Puritan, was acquired by Borden, which paid $12.4 million for net assets with
a book value of $2.8 million. Borden's books thus showed a $9.6 million
"goodwill" asset for this operation.
If one defines nationwide sales of either processed lemon juice
(i.e., lemon juice sold except in the form of fresh lemons) or reconstituted
lemon juice (described below) as the relevant market, Realemon brand
reconstituted lemon juice seems to have maintained about a 90% share through
the 1960Ts. n the other hand, if the market s expanded to include fresh
lemons, Realemon's historic share would drop to something below 30% on a
gallon basis and below 10% on a dollar basis.3
After 1952, Sunkist brand reconstituted lemon juice seems to have
achieved a fairly wide distribution. During the period, Realemon charged
a lower list price in the eastern U.S. than elsewhere, the stated purpose
being "to more closely meet the Sunkist price" there,9 In 1958, Sunkist
cut back its reconstituted lemon juice operation because of the "highly
competitive" situation it faced; it now sells only in the Southwest.1 0
Realemon was the only brand of processed lemon juice in national distri-
bution during the 1960's, and it was the only brand to which non-trivial
amounts of advertising were devoted, (Realemon's advertising/sales ratio
was apparently not unusually high, l)
If one ignores the "goodwill" asset mentioned above, the rate of
return on assets for Borden's Realemon Foods subdivision (the principal
product of which.was Realemon brand reconstituted lemon juice, accounting
for 75% of its revenue) averaged about 3.3 times that of the Food and Kindred
Products aggregate for 1963 - 1973 and about 4.4 times that benchmark return
for 1968 - 1973. If Realemon's assets are augmented by the "goodwill"
it carried on its books, these multiples fall to about 1.5 and 1.7,
respectively. 1 2
In 1969, Golden Crown Citrus Corporation was a Chicago-based
firm engaged primarily in the home delivery of fruit juices in the
Chicago area, It was in some financial distress. New top management,
with no experience in retail distribution, decided, without doing any
detailed market studies, to begin selling reconstituted lemon juice to
supermarkets.l3 It encountered no technical problems; all parties seem
to agree with the judge's description of the technology involved: 1 4
Reconstituted lemon juice is manufactured by adding
water, a preservative or preservatives, and lemon
oil to pure lemon juice concentrate which is purchased
in bulk, often in tank cars, by large producers such
as Borden. The ingredients are mixed according to
a simple, well-known formula, using uncomplicated,
relatively inexpensive equipment of the sort employed
by any juice bottling operation,
Golden Grown did find, as had all other regional producers, that in order
to induce grocers to stock its product and consumers to buy it, its price
had to be well below Realemon's, It priced accordingly, apparently making
some sales at prices below any reasonable definition of cost. (In addition,
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the trial revealed that Golden Crown had lowered its cost by adulterating
its product, though Borden's chemists had previously been unable to prove
this.) Golden Crown grew rapidly after 1969. Since most grocers seemed
willing to carry at most two brands of reconstituted lemon juice, Realemon
and a low-priced brand, Golden Crown's initial gains came at the expense
of other small producers.
By 1971, however, Realemon began to consider Golden Crown a force to
be reckoned with, This perception was apparently correct. Golden Crown
entered the East in 1970, the Northeast in 1971, the Southeast in 1972,
and the West and Southwest in 1973, In 1973, Golden Crown also acquired
a second production facility, in New Jersey., (Realemon had plants in
Chicago, New York, and California.) Golden Crown's (gallon) share of
processed lemon juice sales rose from virtually zero in 1969 to about 15%
in 1974; most of these sales were made in the northeastern portion of
the country, (In early 1973, about 55% of Golden Crown's sales were made
in the New York, Philadelphia, Chicago, and Detroit areas, versus about
38% of Realemon's.) Over this same period, Realemon's national share
fell from around 90% to about 75%.
After 1969, Realemon's list prices were lower in areas in which
it faced the most intense competition from Golden Crown and others.
(List prices had been the same in all regions of the U.S. in 1967 and 1968.)
Realemon's 1971 - 1974 marketing plans reveal a concern with this "low-
priced" -competition and an intention to use selective discounts off list
price (generally in the form of promotional allowances) to deal with it.
The 1973 plan announced the objective of regaining half Realemon's
1971 - 1972 share loss, which amounted to about four percentage points
on a gallon basis. This was to be achieved primarily by offering selective
1%
-8-
discounts in key areas. In fact, Realemon's share fell by another three points
in 1973. The 1974 marketing plan called for an increase in list price,
but only in areas not much affected by Golden Crown, along with an increase
in advertising and discounting in areas where Golden Crown was a factor.
That plan stated as an objective the reduction of Golden Crown's share
in four "key Districts" (listed in the preceding paragraph) from 18% to
14%, with Realemon's share to increase from 71% to 75%, Various other
documents were introduced into evidence that seemed to indicate an
intention to attempt to reduce Golden Crownts market share (and to
increase Realemon's) in various areas, and thereby to impair Golden
Crown's ability to expand in new areas, chiefly by offering selective
discounts of one form or another.
The lowest net prices seem to have been paid by the leading grocery
chains in Philadelphia and Buffalo, both of which purchased substantial
numbers of 12-quart cases of Realemon for $4.05 in December, 1973,
(Other stores in these areas paid $4.20 or more.) On the basis of
documents from Realemon's files for this period, complaint counsel
charged that these prices were below Realemon's average variable cost.
But the judge accepted average variable cost estimates, prepared
subsequently, of $3.83 per case for Philadephia and $3,75 for Buffalo,
He thus found that these sales, and all of Realemon's other sales, had
been made at prices above average variable cost, He did point out, however,
that15
The $4.05 per case price is close to Realemon's national
average per case cost on a direct shipment basis, This
cost appears to have been the only data available to
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Borden management at the time the subject sales
were made,,,. Thus, at the time of the sales in
question, Borden either failed to consider its
cost before agreeing to the low sale prices, or
knew that it was selling very close to the cost
figures reflected in the data that was [sic]
then available to it.
Realemon estimated Golden Crown's average total costs as of the
end of 1972 for these markets at $3.74; Golden Crown's estimate as of the
end of 1973 was $4,QQ, After receiving the discounts mentioned in
the preceding paragraph, both chains sold Realemon st 39¢ per quart,
(By comparison, Realemon retailed at an everage of just over 60 a
quart nationwide in early 1973,) With 12 quarts per case, this gave
the Philadephia chain a 10% markup, In this price range, grocers testified
that Golden Crown would have had to be 10¢-15¢ cheaper at retail in order
to avoid drastic sales losses, Assuming the same grocer markup, this
require Golden Crown to wholesale at between $2.62 and $3.16 per
case, well below Realemon's average variable cost and Golden Crown's
average total cost. If, as seems to have been the case, grocers demanded
larger margins on Golden Crown, it would have had to sell for even less
in order effectively to meet Realemon's price, Central to this, of course,
is the "premium brand" status of Realemon; Golden Crown simply could not
sell its product unless it offered grocers a substantial discount below
the Realemon price, even though the two products were virtually identical.
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Golden Crown complained about Realemon's pricing to the Chicago
regional office of the Federal Trade Commission, After an investigation,
the Commission filed a complaint against Borden (Realemon) in July, 1974,
Late in 1974, the assets, name, and business of Golden Crown were acquired
by a subsidiary of the Seven-Up Corporation. A successor to Golden Crown,
G.C. Citrus, retained some of Golden Crown's liabilities and received a
cash payment from Seven-Up. At the time of its purchase, Golden's Crown's
liabilities exceeded its assets by about $1 million. Subtracting Seven-Up's
cash payment from the Golden Crown liabilities assumed by G.C. Citrus
yields a net liability of around $600,000. It thus seems that Seven-Up
paid about $400,000 for Golden Crown's "goodwill" 1 6 By comparison,
Golden Crown had lost about $500,000 on its operations in the preceding
fiscal year.
Trial in this matter began in May, 1975 and concluded in February,
1976, The initial decision of the administrative law judge was handed
down in August, 1976. Borden was found to have violated the law:1 7
Respondent Borden, Inc,, possesses, and has
possessed, a monopoly position and monopoly power
in the processed lemon juice market, and has unlaw-
fully engaged in acts and practices with the purpose
and intent, and with the effect, of preserving and
maintaining that monopoly position and power, and
has unlawfully hindered, restrained and prevented
competition in the production, marketing and sale
of processed lemon juice in violation of Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act,
III
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The acts and practices listed here were maintenance of different list
prices and promotional allowances (discounts) in different areas,
charging different net prices to different individual customers, and
making sales at "unreasonably low prices". Borden was ordered to
license the Realemon trademark, at royalty rates designed to cover only
the cost of quality control, to all comers for a period of ten years.
Borden appealed to the Commission, both briefs were filed by the end
of January, 1977, but as this is written, the Commission has yet to
hand down its decision,
Of the 204 findings of fact in the Initial Decision, 64 were
concerned with the question of whether processed lemon juice was a
valid market, the alternative being to include fresh lemons. A
similar allocation of effort to this issue is found in the various
documents filed by complaint counsel and Borden after the close of
trial. The question of market definition is discussed in the next
section, along with the basic reason for its perceived importance in
this case: the light it presumably shed on Realemon's market power
or lack thereof,
-A second key issue in this case is whether or not Realemon's
pricing was such as to establish monopolization. This topic is
considered in light of recent suggestions regarding predatory pricing,
and in light of demand conditions in this market, in Section 4.
Finally, the relief ordered in the Initial Decision is some-
what novel and has been the subject of considerable discussion. Some
of the'economiC aspects involved in trademark licensing are considered
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in Section 5, where emphasis is placed on the importance of understanding
the special features of the situation considered.
3. Market Definition and Market Power
All parties involved in the Realemon litigation seem to have attached
considerable importance to the definition of "the relevant market".
Nothing in the antitrust statutes compelled this concern; those laws do
not mention markets, But the reason for the perceived importance of
market definition in this case is clear: if "the relevant market" were
held to include fresh lemons along with processed lemon juice, Realemon's
market share would be below the minimum levels associated in the case law
with the possession of monopoly powerl8 Only if Realemon were held to
have monopoly power would the court reach the question of whether that
power had been unlawfully exercised or maintained,
In this section, I hope to show that the standard market definition
-- market share approach to the measurement of monopoly power is defensible
only if attention is restricted to a limited class of economic models,
in which all products within "the relevant market" are physically homo-
genous and there are no important linkages between the market considered
and any other individual firms or markets. It is clear that these assump-
tions do not apply to the situation analyzed in Realemon, nor do they
apply in other cases in which the market definition -- market share
approach has been employed, Even when this'approach is defensible,
it provides only an incomplete indication of one aspect of monopoly power:
short-run ability to affect price. Better tools for the analysis of
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short-run monopoly power exist. Further, the market definition --
market share approach says nothing at all about the long-run dimension
of monopoly power that was the main issue in Realemon; the ability to
affect price in the long run through restriction of new competition,
Application of the market share test for monopoly power in the Realemon
case was, in short, largely wasted effort,
The distinction between short-run and long-run monopoly power is
important but often overlooked, 9 As the Initial Decision in Realemon
notes (p. 151), "Monopoly power has long been defined [by the courts]
as the power to control prices or unreasonably restrict competition,"
This usage suggests that monopoly power is a force that, like electricity,
can be employed to perform a variety of unrelated tasks, In fact, a
firm may have the short-run power to control prices without any long-run
ability to restrict competition, Wilkinson Sword was the only seller
of stainless steel razor blades in the U.S. for a (relatively short)
time, During that period, it presumably had some control over the price
of its output, but later effective entry would seem to make clear its
inability to restrict competition. Similarly, a patent that lowers the
cost of making paper will not by itself give its holder any ability to
control the price of paper, but it will provide the power to protect
profits from new competition, "The power to control prices" derives
from the ability to make utput changes large enough to have a noticeable
impact on buyers, while the power "unreasonably [to] restrict competition"
in the long run must derive from some advantage over actual or potential
competitors that inherently serves, or can be exploited to serve this
purpose,
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In all economic models of which I am aware, the statement that a
firm has short-run monopoly power is equivalent to the statement that
the firm's optimal price is above its marginal cost, On this test, most
firms have some short-run monopoly power, and most groups of competing
firms have potential monopoly power, in the sense that their optimal
collusive or cartel policy would involve price above marginal cost.
But as a practical matter, antitrust cannot be concerned with all
deviations from perfection, only with important deviations.
The obvious test for the existence and importance of short-run
monopoly power involves comparing prices and marginal costs; if price
exceeds marginal cost by an appreciable margin, non-trivial short-run
monopoly power is present, But it is notoriously difficult to define
and quantify marginal cost with any precision.
A second approach is suggested by standard microeconomic theory,
Suppose, for purposes of discussion, that Realemon were the only seller
of processed lemon juice in the country. The evidence seems clear that
neither fresh lemons nor any other product is a perfect substitute for
processed lemon juice, so that it would be sensible to think of Realemon
as facing a downward sloping demand curve at any instant. Given all this,
an economist would likely invoke, the standard formula for monopoly equili-
brium in analysis of Realemon's short-run monopoly power;
(P - MC)/P lE (1)
where P is price, MC is marginal cost, and E is the absolute value of
the price elasticity of demand, all other prices in the economy held
fixed, (In the present context, this last assumption might be worrisome.
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Might not the demand for fresh lemons be affected. noticeably byRealemon's
price, with effects that would feed back to Realemon's demand curve?
I return to this point below,)
The quantity on the left of the equation (1) is Lerner's (1934)
measure of the degree of monopoly, As was mentioned above, it may be
difficult to estimate it directly. Equation (1) indicates that this problem
can be avoided, under the assumptions mentioned above, by estimating the
elasticity of demand for processed lemon juice,20 Various evidence cited
in the Initial Decision indicates that E is finite, since there do not
appear to be any perfect substitutes for processed lemon juice in the
short tun, but t is not clear that one could refine this estimate much.
Prices may not have varied enough to permit statistical techniques to
yield precise estimates of E, and in most situations this elasticity may
vary both with the level of price charged and with the length of time
over which buyer response to price changes is measured, In the actual
situation in Realemon there is a further complication: since other firms
selling processed lemon juice might be expected to react to a Realemon
price change, the."all other prices constant" elasticity might not be
the relevant quantity for Realemon decision-making, The elasticity
that Realemon management would rationally employ must take into account
any expected competitive reactions, and these expectations cannot be measured
with any precision at all by an outside observer,
There is a third quantity that can shed light on the existence and
importance of short-run monopoly power: the level of excess profits. If
unit costs are constant, so that marginal cost equals average cost
(including a normal return on capital), multiplication and division of
the left-hand side of equation (1) by unit sales shows that the ratio
of excess profit (or monopoly rent) to sales revenue equals 1/E in monopoly
equilibrium. In general, the presence of substantial excess profit may
reflect important short-run monopoly power, But profits do not imply
power, since purely competitive firms can receive excess profits in
short-run disequilibrium,2 Moreover, it is not always trivial to
penetrate the fog of accounting convention and estimate accurately the
magnitude of excess profit, Still, information on the level of profit
being earned, coupled with an analysis of alternative explanations for
excess profits (if detected), can shed considerable light on the importance
of short-run monopoly power. While there are serious measurement problems
here, they seem generally to be less severe than those encountered in
estimating marginal cost or demand elasticities, 2 2 The key problem with
this approach is that if one finds excess profits, further analysis is
required before one can conclude that they reflect short-run monopoly
power,
Long-run monopoly power that is worth having and that is likely
to be an issue in antitrust proceedings must permit a firm or group
of firms to protect excess profits from conpetitive erosion. 3 Thus,
one consequence of significant long-run monopoly power is the persistence
of short-run monopoly power, which in turn should be reflected in
persistent excess profits, The persistence of substantial excess profit
generally indicates the presence of some sort of obstacle to effective
competition, but not all such obstacles stem from the exercise of the
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power to exclude or restrain rivals, The developer of a highly profitable
new liquor that requires long aging, for instance, might enjoy a substan-
tial period of high profits before rivals' products were ready to market,
Similarly, a firm with extraordinary cost advantages over all actual or
potential rivals might continue to earn excess profits over a long period.
(The obstacle to effective competition in this case would be whatever
prevented other firms from attaining similarly low costs,)
Following Bain (1956), it has become standard to refer to obstacles
to effective competition that serve to preserve excess profits as "barriers
to entry", though as Caves and Porter (1977) have recently emphasized,
such obstacles can affect established sellers as well as (actual or
potential) new entrants, Almost as a matter of definition, such obstacles
must rest on some sort. of long-lived advantage over rivals. Sometimes
a firm may obtain such an advantage merely by virtue of having been the
first to engage in some activity, as when cost and demand conditions permit
only one seller to operate profitably, but this is by no means a universal
occurance, Similarly, some obstacles may serve by themselves to prevent
profit erosion, without the necessity for the firm to modify its policies
in the interests of restricting competition,24 But this is not universally
the case either: in some instances explicit acts or practices aimed at
actual or potential rivals may be necessary to perserve profits. If such
acts are taken, it becomes meaningful to speak of the exercise of long-run
monopoly power, But if competition is sufficiently restricted (so that
excess profits are not threatened) without the need to focus attention on
other firms, it is sensible to speak of the possession of long-run
Or
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monopoly power, but it is not clear what one might mean by its exercise,
In any case, while persistent excess profits strongly suggest the
existence of long-run monopoly power, further analysis is required to
determine the source of that power and the manner in which is has been
exercised, if at all.25
In the foregoing general remarks, there was no mention of "the
market", Indeed, this concept is not strictly necessary for the analysis
of monopoly power, actual or potential, short-run or long-run. This is
not to say that market definition is never an instructive exercise, however.
The classical economists recognized that a bushel of wheat harvested
in Illinois is, strictly speaking, a different commodity than an other-
wise identical bushel harvested in Kansas; they are not perfect substitutes
for a buyer located in Chicago, But if buyers or sellers can transform
one into the other by using readily available means of transport, the price
at which one can be sold will be tighly restricted by the price at which
the other is sold, If commodities differ only in terms of location, and
if their prices are closely linked by transportation possibilities, it
makes sense to aggregate them into a market, By using data on transporta-
tion costs, shipping patterns, and correlations among prices at different
locations, one can produce defensible (though inevitably imperfect)
definitions of the extent of the geographic "market" for narrowly defined
commodities.26
Let us further follow the classical writers and assume that the market
thus defined can be usefully analyzed in isolation, That is, let us suppose
that the effects of changes in that market are sufficiently small and
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widely dispersed throughout the entire economy that one can neglect the
possibility of feedback effects, (The issue is the stability of the
demand and cost schedules employed, Suppose the price of steel is raised.
Since steel sales are sizeable relative to GNP, this may produce sizeable
changes in the prices of a number of other products, and these shifts
may in turn affect the costs of steel production or the demand for steel.
The classical (partial equilibrium) analysis assumes such feedback effects
away,) One can then take the demand for the product considered as
determined primarily by its own price; there exists a well-defined demand
curve of the usual blackboard variety that is relevant to decision-making,
Under all these assumptions, market share may serve as a partial indicator
of the extent of short-run monopoly power.
The analysis goes as follows, Since all sellers' outputs are
effectively perfect substitutes (after transportation, if necessary),
any seller that reduced price a penny below the going market price (which
is here well-defined) would receive the entire market demand, and any
seller that priced a penny above the market would sell nothing. This
would suggest that no firm could have any short-run monopoly power,
even if there were only two or three sellers, A more sensible approach
in such situations is to consider output, not price, to be the decision
variable, Then, if rivalry is as intense as one can imagine, so that
each firm makes the output decision that maximizes its own profits given
its rivals' decisions, it is easy to show that the equilibrium condition
for the Ith (typical) firm in the market is the following:27
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(P MC )/P si/E (2)
where MC. is the ith firms's marginal cost and s. is its share of the
market, Again, the quantity on the left is a direct measure of the
firm's short-run monopoly power. If this is difficult to estimate directly,
one can instead employ the quantity on the right, the ratio of the firm's
market share to the elasticity of demand for the market as a whole, Even
in this hyper-classical case, market share is not the whole story: a
firm with a large share of a market with highly elastic demand will
set a price indistinguishable from marginal cost, Further, it should
be obvious that knowing a firmrs market share in this model, or even the
ratio of its share to the market demand elasticity, reveals nothing
about its long-run monopoly power, Finally, there is no critical or
threshold value of market share in this sort of model, above which the
firm has monopoly power and below which it has none,
While the market definition by aggregation over space has firm
foundations in classical economics, aggregation over non-identical.
products (the sort of aggregation that was a key issue in the Realemon
litigation) seems to have as its intellectual basis the procedures followed
28
in some empirical work in industrial organization. In order to use
statistical techniques to test hypotheses about the determinants and results
of inter-firm rivalry, many investigators have mass-produced data on
sizeable numbers of "markets". The usual rule is that the latter should
include all products among which buyers and sellers can easily switch,
so that each "market" used in the analysis corresponds to a set of
-
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sellers that are in more or less direct competition, Rarely is there
any claim that this can be done with great precision. If the sample
of "markets" is large enough, it is reasonable to hope that minor and
non-systematic errors in the allocation of sellers to "markets" will
not have much effect on the results obtained, Many studies of this sort
take profitability as an indicator of monopoly power and seek to explain
variations in profitability across "markets" as functions of observable
quantities, 29
With all this as background, let us consider the market definition
exercise in the Initial Decision in Realemon, along with its legal and
economic implications for market power, The judge concluded that fresh
lemons and processed lemon juice were not closely linked on the supply
side, since they employ different production and distribution processes,
This appears sensible as a short-run finding, but to assert it for the
long run is to assert that entry into the processed lemon juice industry
is difficult, and a finding of distinct technology cannot justify such-an
assertion. He then considered a great deal of evidence on the demand
side, Respondents produced usage data that indicated that fresh lemons
and processed lemon juice are often used by households for the same
things, (Both are used in tea and lemonade, for instance.) Econometric
work was introduced that seemed to show a significant (negative) relation
between the relative price of the two commodities and their relative
sales, and it was pointed out that Realemon advertising had historically
stressed its advantages vis vis fresh lemons. Complaint counsel
stressed the different attributes (taste, shelf life, etc,) of the two
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products, substantial and variable per-ounce price differences, and the
apparent lack of attention paid to the price of fresh lemons by producers
and (wholesale) buyers of processed lemon juice. Judge Hanscom weighed
and sorted all this evidence and concluded that the two products were
not sufficiently close substitutes in demand to require placing them in
the same market for antitrust purposes. He then drew an inference about
monopoly power:30
Having determined that processed lemon juice
constitutes, at the least, a valid submarket for
the purposes of this proceeding, there is no question
that respondent BordenTs Realemon brand over the
years has had, and now has, a monopoly share of
that market.
Later discussion (p. 151) notes the apparently well-established legal
principle that "The existence of monopoly power may be inferred from a
predominant share of the market,"
Can this procedure and the economic inference drawn from it be
rationalized in terms of the foregoing discussion of the nature and
measurement of short-run and long-run monopoly power? Not readily.
No evidence was offered or considered comparing Realemon's prices to
its marginal costs. Thus an indirect measure of Realemon's short-run
monopoly power was necessary. The market definition -- market share
analysis undertaken to construct such a measure can be viewed, charitably,
I think, as an attempt to use something like the homogenous product
model that underlies equation (2) above to construct such a measure.
A+
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But that model is obviously inappropriate here. The evidence seems
clear that competing brands of processed lemon juice were not viewed
by buyers as perfect substitutes, though the impact of the pricing of
one brand on the demand for -another was often substantial. It also
seems obvious that processed lemon juice and fresh lemons are substitutes --
but imperfect substitutes. The decision is written as if this latter clear
fact must be overlooked, either by ignoring the demand linkage between
these two products (and defining "the relevant market" narrowly) or by
assuming that they are perfect substitutes (and using a broad market
definition), Either approach must involve the use of an inappropriate
economic model, and there are no simple rules for deciding which of the
two is likely to be the less misleading,
In the first place, there is no single "best" measure of the
31degree of substitutability between two products in consumption. Thus
any attempt to quantify the relation between imperfect substitutes is open
to valid attack, Moreover, even if a single "best" measure did exist,
it would certainly have to take on a wide range of values in principle,
with no natural thresholds or break-points,
About the most that one can conclude from the finding that fresh
lemons and processed lemon juice are imperfect substitutes is that the
demand curve for the latter, whether or not feedback effects involving
the price of fresh lemon are considered, has a finite elasticity, This
is not enough, even if one takes all brands of processed lemon juice as
perfect substitutes, to permit one to conclude that Realemon's large share
of processed lemon juice sales translates into non-trivial short-run
-24-
monopoly power. To draw this inference, one would have to know, at least,
the magnitude of the price elasticity of demand for processed lemon juice.
Even then, it is not obvious that the classical "all other prices constant"
elasticity would be appropriate, since Realemon might well take into account
its impact on the price of fresh lemons and the feedback effect from that
price to the demand curve for processed lemon juice, (This effect might
be negligible, of course; the question is an empirical one.)
Had the judgets consideration of the mountain of conflicting evidence
on substitution in consumption led him to the other model under consideration,
which treats processed lemon juice and fresh lemons as perfect substitutes,
the analytical error involved in the inference that Realemon's share of
that "market" implied no monopoly power would be even more obvious.
Very little meaning can be attached to "market share" when the "market"
includes commodities that are plainly imperfect substitutes. One cannot
conclude that Mercedes has no short-run monopoly power from its share
of the US, automobile "market", much less from its share of the U,S.
motor vehicle "market",
In short, the market definition -- market share analysis in Realemon
proves nothing at all about respondent's short-run monopoly power. Even
if a demand-side analysis had been done correctly, using precise estimates
of the many relevant elasticities and expectations, it would say nothing
about the firm's long-run monopoly power, its ability to restrict
competition,
The problems with the market definition -- market share approach
in Realemon are certainly not limited to that case, Market definition
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exercises rest on the implicit assumption that in any situation there
must exist a grouping of products and sellers such that (a) all products
within the group ("'the relevant market") are very nearly perfect substi-
tutes, and (b) no products.outside the group are good substitutes for
any products within it, would hope that is it clear by now that such
a grouping may not exist in the case under consideration. The narrow
definition proposed by complaint counsel and accepted by the judge
(processed lemon juice) could be correctly attacked for violating (b)
above. On the other hand, the broad definition proposed by respondent
(processed lemon juice plus fresh lemons) could be correctly attacked
for violating (a) above. The judge was left with the problem of deciding
which violation was more serious, a very ill-posed and intractable problem.
In many other situations, where aggregation over physically distinct
products or products perceived by buyers as different is attempted,
similar logically correct attacks on any proposed market definition will
likely be possible. If the facts in any case indicate that no satisfactory
market definition is possible, then, since theory tells use that even with
such a definition and the corresponding market share information only limited
inferences can be drawn, why attempt the impossible task of market definition?
The nitial Decision (pp. 67-8) does cite Realemon's apparently
extraordinary profitability as confirming the monopoly power implied
by its dominant share of "the relevant market", Excluding the "goodwill"
asset on Realemon's bookswhich obviously was present because the price
paid for the business in 1962 reflected the high future profits it was
expected to produce, and assuming no unusually severe accounting problems,
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Realemonts return on invested capital (see Section 2, above) indicates
persistent excess profits,. This establishes at least a presumption of
persistent short-run monopoly power, and it shows, more importantly,
that Borden would have something to lose if rivalry intensified, That
is, the evidence on prQfitability indicates that Realemon would have
an interest in restraining competition, and the persistence of high returns
indicates the presence of some sort of obstacle to effective competition.
But this is only a starting point from which analysis of that obstacle
and of RealemonTs possible long-run monopoly power can procede,
4. Tests for Predatory Pricing
As Section 2, above, indicates, it seems clear that Realemon's
pricing policy was influenced by the actions of other producers of
processed lemon juice, Golden Crown in particular. Realemon reacted
to Golden Crown's rapid expansion and the erosion of its own market
share (which it generally computed in terms of processed lemon juice)
by lowering prices in geographic areas where Golden Crown's share was
largest, Given that Realemon was found to possess monopoly power, the
legal question is whether or not its pricing policy constituted unlawful
maintenance of that power, Or, adopting Bork's (1978, p, 144) provisional
definition of predation as "a firm's deliberate aggression against one
or more rivals through the employment of business practices that would
not be considered profit-maximizing except for the expectation either that
(1) rivals will be driven from the market ,,, or (2) rivals will be
chastened sufficiently to abandon competitive behavior the predator
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finds inconvenient or threatening", was RealemonTs pricing predatory?
Since Borden was apparently not a notably badly-run firm, if
predatory pricing could be shown to be irrational in general or in this
case, it might be possible to establish a presumption that its pricing
was not predatory. (Such a showing would not prove the point beyond doubt,
though; even well-run firms sometimes make mistakes. And, as Posner
(1976, p. 187-8) notes in this context, if certain kinds of mistakes have
significant adverse consequences, it may be good policy to prescribe
penalities for those who make them.) But, as Yamey (1972) and Posner
(1976, pp. 184-6) have argued convincingly, economic theory cannot
(yet, at least) prove that predatory pricing is never in the predator's
interest, The predator sacrifices some current profit in the expectation
of future gain. Rationality can be directly evaluated only by comparing
the sacrifice with the expected gain, and the latter is hard to assess
in principle and impossible to observe in practice, If the predator has
sufficient advantages over the prey, (e.g., much easier access to liquid
capital), and if an episode of predation has desirable long-lived effects
on the employment of relevant assets or on the expectations of actual or
potential rivals, predatory pricing may be profitable after the fact and
thus may appear profitable before the fact. Actions that appear mad in
the short run may be quite sane in the long run, as a reputation for
irrationality may instill a valuable (to the predator) timidity in actual
or potential rivals.32 Similarly, current models cannot yield firm
judgements as to the rationality or irrationality of predatory pricing
under any particular set of observable conditions.
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Most economists would, I think, agree with Areeda and Turner
(1975, p, 669) that "proven cases of predatory pricing have been extremely
rare". Both they and Bork (1978, pp. 144-55) draw the reasonable inference
that, since predatory pricing is often charged, it in fact occurs very
rarely - whether it is rational or not. Areeda and Turner (1975, p. 669)
note that this impies that one must be careful in formulating rules for
dealing with alleged predatory pricing, "lest the threat of litigation,
particularly by private parties, materially deter legitimate, competitive
pricing,"33 Bork (1978, pp. 154-5) goes further and argues that it is
unwise "to construct rules about a phenomenon that probably does not exist
or which, should it exist in very rare cases, the courts would have grave
difficulty distinguishing from competitive price behavior," He would thus
drop predatory pricing from the list of possible antitrust violations. 34
Most economists would, I think, agree with Areeda and Turner. Bork's
proposal is less likely to win wide acceptance,
X shall return to this proposal below, First, however, it is
instructive to consider, in the context of the facts in Realemon, some
recent attempts to use economic theory to devise more or less clear standards
for predatory pricing. Specifically, do these analyses permit a clear-cut
judgement to be passed on Realemon's pricing behavior?
Areeda and Turner (1975), in an influential and widely-cited essay,
propose definite tests for predation, to be applied (p. 732) to "a
monopolist" in a "market in which he has monopoly power". 35 As the
preceding Section sought to show through the example of Realemon, there
are no clear rules for deciding, on the basis of the traditional market
11
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definition -- market share exercise whether or not any particular
seller can be so described, This difficulty is not unique to the
Areeda-Turner analysis, however, so I will return to it below. Areeda
and Turner argue that because marginal cost pricing has well-known
efficiency properties, and because only prices equal to or above mar-
ginal cost can maximize short-run profits under any plausible assumptions,
only prices below short-run marginal cost. should be considered predatory,
Recognizing that reliable estimates of marginal cost are difficult to
obtain, they propose (p. 733) the use of "reasonably anticipated average
variable cost" as the standard; prices above this quantity are to be
lawful, prices below it predatory and unlawful, This shift is not
without its substantive consequences, as Scherer (1976a) has pointed out,
but the technical issues he raises seem secondary in the present context.
Indeed, the Initial Decision in Realemon (pp. 117-30) considers
the average variable cost test, citing Areeda-Turner. As Section 2,
above, noted, Realemon's prices were apparently above accurate estimates
of its average variable cost prepared after the fact, If it could have
"reasonably anticipated" those figures, the Areeda-Turner test would
declare its pricing lawful. On the other hand, it is not clear what the
firm thought its costs were at the time the prices in question were set.
Some of its prices were close to or (depending on how the figures are
treated) below the unit cost figures that were available to decision-makers.
In any case, the price-cost gaps were not huge under any of the definitions
discussed in the Initial Decision, Do any set of cost estimates deserve
to be treated as exact values of "reasonably anticipated average variable
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cost", so that prices below such estimates by tiny amounts would serve
to establish a violation?37 If the reality of likely cost estimation
error is considered, how can it be incorporated into the rule? While
I don't think the Areeda-Turner test gives a crystal clear result in
Realemon, it does seem to point toward the legality of respondent's
pricing.
Posner (1976, p. 188) defines predatory pricing as "pricing at
a level calculated to exclude from the market an equally or more efficient
competitor," After analyzing the implications of this definition, he
concludes that "Proof of sales below average balance sheet costs with
intent to exclude might be enough to establish a prima facie case of
predatory pricing," Average balance sheet costs would be obtained by
dividing total accounting cost by output; if the accounting system has
no major biases, this quantity is approximately average total economic
cost, minus the per-unit cost of equity capital. 3 A prima facie case
could be rebutted by a defendant's showing that its pricing could be
justified in terms of the relevant marginal cost,
In trying to apply this analysis to Realemon, a number of problems
arise. First, in terms of the underlying definition, was Golden Crown
"an equally or more efficient competitor"? Golden Crown's production
costs per ounce of lemon juice seem to have been comparable to Realemon's.
But, all else equal, buyers were willing to pay more for an ounce of
Realemon than for an ounce of Golden Crown, Thus, in terms of the dollar
value of outputs per dolla~ of inputs employed, Realemon was distinctly
more efficient,
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I think a case can be made that the premium price commanded by
Realemon was in part at least a reflection of consumerst greater experi-
ence with it than with rival brands. (Some arguments for this view are
sketched in Section 5, below,) That is, there was learning on the demand
side, It is at least plausible, since the two products were apparently
physically indistinguishable, that if buyers had had the same experience
with Golden Crown that they had with Realemon, the two products would have
been able to sell for the same price, Then, if one adopts a static notion
of efficiency, buyers' preferences for Realemon would seem to imply that
it was more efficient than Golden Crown. But if one takes a more dynamic
view of efficiency, there is no obvious reason to suppose that Golden
Crown was not "an eually or more efficient competitor", Exactly the
same problem araises under classical "learning-by-doing" in production,
which implies that a firm's unit cost is a decreasing function of its
39
total cumulative output to date, Under this assumption, a new entrant
may have higher costs today than an established firm, even though with
the same production experience it would have the same costs,
It seems likely, though by no means certain, on the basis of the
data n the Initial Decision (pp, 117-30), that Realemon made at least
some sales below its "average balance sheet cost", Applying Posner's
suggested test, this is a key issue: if the firm never sold below
"average balance sheet cost", charges should be dismissed, while if it
did, further inquiry would be necessary, But if we step back from Posner's
test to the definition of predation from which it is derived, things
seem less clear, As Section 2, above, indicated, Realemon was in a
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position confidently to expect that in order effectively to meet its
prices, Golden Crown would have to sell below its own "average balance
sheet costs". If a static view of efficiency is adopted, Golden Crown
was a less efficient competitor, and only Realemon's costs matter.
But if one accepts that in a dynamic sense Golden Crown was arguably
as efficient as Realemon, it could be argued that prices above Realemon's
"average balance sheet costs" could serve to exclude an equally efficient
competitor if they forced losses upon Golden Crown. Acceptance of an
argument of this sort could, of course, place Realemon in the awkward
position of having to justify its prices in terms of its reasonably-
derived estimates of a rival's costs,
In order to establish a prima facie case against Realemon, Posner
would also require some evidence of exclusionary intent, though he
clearly recognizes (pp, 189-90) the difficulty of establishing intent
in litigation. In Realemon, complaint counsel were able to find a
number of documents that at the very least strongly suggest that
Realemon's top management intended to regain sales lost to Golden Crown
and to reduce the latter's share or at least hinder its expansion, Some
documents, though apparently none written by top management, suggest an
intent to exclude Golden Crown from some some areas. If one follows
Posner (1976, p, 190) and gives little weight to the latter because of
"the inveterate tendancy of sales executives to brag to their superiors
about their competitive prowess, often using metaphors of coercion that
are compelling evidence of predatory intent to the naive," one is left
with little that points to exclusionary intent, It would appear then,
11
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that Posner's requirements for a prima facie case against Realemon
cannot be met, If, however, Posner, like Bork (1978, p, 144) had
considered the chastening of rivals to be a possible goal of predation
and had phrased his rule to allow intent to chasten to satisfy it, it
would seem that a prima facie could be made.
Accepting such a broadened rule, could Realemon have rebutted
this case? Probably, since it could argue that in an intensely competitive
situation, in which rivals are selling below average total cost, the
quantity relevant for pricing decisions is short-run marginal cost.
It could then invoke Areeda-Turner, use average variable cost as a
proxy for short-run marginal cost, and point to the evidence that it
never sold below its average variable cost. Thus, though a slightly
broadened version of Posner's rule would likely, though not certainly,
~Suggest that Realemon engaged in predatory pricing, the latter would likely,
though again not certainly, be able to rebut the presumption thus established
by, in effect, invoking the Areeda-Turner test. Since the rebuttal
argument just outlined must be useable in many cases, it might be simpler
just to begin with the average variable cost test,
Scherer (1976a, 1976b) and Williamson (1977) effectively criticize
the economic models underlying these cost-based rules, Both argue that,
by its very nature, predatory pricing is transient and, generally,
localized in space. Thus, the relation between, say, price and marginal
cost during an episode of such pricing in some locality is likely to be
of negligible welfare importance relative to pricing policies at other
times and in other places. Had Realemon made sales to the Philadelphia
or
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and Buffalo chains mentioned in Section 2 at prices below marginal
cost in December, 1973, it is true that an efficiency loss, relative
to sales at marginal cost, would have been produced. But to focus
closely on this loss and to ignore the substantial general excess of
price over marginal cost suggested by Realemon's overall profitability
is to use one small, atypical tree to evaluate a large forest. Both
Scherer and Williamson argue that a propoer application of economic
principles in this context involves consideration of the overall, long-
run effects of predation or of any standards adopted by the courts to
define it. At this point, they part company; Scherer suggests the
necessity for a detailed "rule of reason" examination of the relavant
facts, while Williamson proposes a set of apparently precise "per se"
rules,
The bulk of Williamson's (1977) analysis is devoted to a dominant
firm's response to the appearance of a new entrant, The rules for this
case are different from those he would apply to established firms.
Without going through the sort of market definition -- market share
exercise discussed in Section 3, above, however, it is not clear how
one would establish that a firm was either dominant in this sense or,
what seems to come to the same thing, a monopolist in the sense of
Areeda and Turner (1975). have tried to argue that such exercises
are an unrealiable approach to the measurement of short-run monopoly power,
and that is presumably the issue here, In the present case, and in
others, one can get at the economically relevant considerations without
defining markets or using structural definitions of "monopoly" or "dominance".
It seems indisputably clear that Realemon and Golden Crown were affected.
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by one another's pricing, It is also clear that Realemon's profits were
plausibly viewed by its management as threatened by Golden Crown; at
the very least, Ralemon would have been better off if Golden Crown
had either vanished or become much less aggressive. This suggests that
Realemon had a motive for chastening or excluding Golden Crown. The
much larger initial sales, wider geographic distribution, and greater
financial resources of Realemon, coupled with its "premium brand" status,
suggest, that it might have had or plausibly thought itself to have had
the ability to chasten or exclude Golden Crown. Surely no showing of
of dominance or monopoly can do more than indicate motive and ability,
and such indications are more appropriately sought in a direct comparison
of the alleged predator and prey than through attempts to define "the
relevant market" and to compute their shares thereof.
In attempting to apply the Williamson rules to Realemon, the first
question that must be faced is whether Golden Crown should be considered
a new entrant or an established firm, It seems to have sold processed
lemon juice, apparently quite aggressively, for over a year before its
name appears in available Realemon documents; this suggests the latter
classification. On the other hand, Golden Crown had not entered all of
Realemon's regional markets, and it would appear that Realemon was worried
that it would later do so effectively. This, along with Golden Crown's
small scale of operations relative to that of Realemon at the time the
the
latter first took actons complained of, suggests that Golden Crown should
be treated as a new entrant. ad the judge been forced to make a choice
here, I do not think he would have found it an easy one, But, on
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Williamson's rules, it would have been an important decision.
Suppose first that Golden Crown is considered to have been
"established", Williamson (1977, pp. 336-7) would then instruct the
judge to ignore "episodic price wars". Was Realemon's pricing more than
this? How would one decide? Must one wait until price is increased
before filing a complaint? Let us go further and suppose that it is
held that Realemon's price cuts were sufficiently long-lived as to be
potentially illegal. Williamson would then apply an average total cost
test, which is seems likely that Realemon would have failed.
Suppose, on the other hand, that Golden Crown is considered to
have been a new entrant, Williamson's analysis of this situation is
based on a standard model, deriving from Bain (1956), of a homogenous
product market with substantial economies of scale and a single established
seller. He assumes that entry will be deterred if the expected post-
entry price is below the entrant's average total cost. He then shows
that a rule prohibiting the established seller from increasing its
output after entry induces that firm to charge a lower pre-entry price in
order to deter entry than would a number of cost-based rules, including
that of Areeda and Turner (1975). His proposed rule for new entry
(p, 334) would thus make it illegal for a dominant firm to increase its
output, adjusted for changes in the level of demand, for 12-18 months
after the appearance of new entry, After that period, an average total
cost test would apply. Though there would likely have been considerable
debate on this point, let us suppose for the sake of argument that all
of Realemon's discounting is held to be subject to this output test,
Did it then engage in predation?
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First, one must face the problem of defining a base period, against
which increases in unit sales are to be measured, Let us, again purely
for the sake of argument, suupose that 1972 is selected, (Respondent
would, of course, argue for an earlier benchmark, probably 1968, the
year before Golden Crown began to challenge it.) Then the evidence
seems clear that Realemon intended to violate Williamson's rule; it
intended to increase its share of processed lemon juice sales in some
regions at the expense of Golden Crown through price cuts. Had it
succeeded, it surely would have increased its demand-adjusted output,
since an increase in share plus a lower average price must imply higher
unit sales.
But Golden Crown was not passive; it may have reacted by making
some sales below its average total cost, a possibility not recognized
in the analysis underlying Williamson's rule. In any case, it does
not seem that Realemon achieved its share objectives; its nationwide
share in 1973 was below that in 1972. It may or may not have managed
to increase demand-adjusted unit sales in its target areas;40 it
certainly could not have checked this until after the fact. Suppose,
as seems likely, that demand-adjusted output did not rise, Should one
then find Realemon guilty of attempted predation or dismiss the charges
because it failed in a serious attempt to break the law? Suppose all
the facts were the same, but no evidence at all on intent were available?
It would seem that Realemon's pricing below average total cost would then
have to be found unlawful unless it extended beyond 18 months after
Golden Crown became visible, in which case Realemon would be found to have
4
predated, Had the Williamson rule been law during the relevant period,
of course, Golden Crown could have ensured itself treble damages by either
failing to react to Realemon's discounting or by failing to make
deliveries in key areas,
Some of the ambiguities and difficult choices that arise when one
attempts to apply the Williamson standards to Realemon would likely
a:ise in other cases as well, But the deeper problem revealed by the
foregoing discussion is that the model underlying Williamson's output
test is inappropriate: it fails in apparently imporatnt respects to fit
the facts of the case. Williamson's potential entrants are deterred
if they expect a post-entry price below their average total cost,
while Golden Crown was apparently willing to expand its sales at such
prices for some time, In Williamson's model, output is a decision
variable, so that it can sensibly be used to evaluate behavior, while
in the processed lemon juice market, demand for any one brand seems to
have depended critically on the prices of all others, Price, not output,
was the decision variable. In Williamson's model there is a single
market price, while rival brands of processed lemon juice sold at
different prices, The barrier to entry that drives: Williamson's model
is the high cost of producing at small scale, but scale economies do not
seem to be important in the production of reconstituted lemon juice,
Finally, the main obstacle to effective competition discussed in the
Initial Decision is the "premium brand" status of Realemon, which enabled
it to command a higher price than other brands. This sort of obstacle
is not easily built into the Williamson model, especially if it is
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plausibly assumed to be capable of erosion over time,
If the economic model from which Williamson's test is derived is
not suitable for use in the analysis of Realemon, it is hard to believe
that acceptance of its implications in all other cases would be appropriate,
But this means that Williamson's rule must be inapplicable to at least
some cases. I have argued above that the Scherer (1976a) -- Williamson
(1977) critique of the economic analysis underlying the (apparently)
simple cost-based rules of Areeda and Turner (1975) and Posner (1976,
pp. 190-1) establishes that these rules cannot be defensibly applied
to all (or even most) cases. If Williamson's rules are not universally
applicable either, it would appear that we do not possess any simple yet
sound tests for predatory pricing, Given the ability of those who have
sought to devise such tests, I think one must at least entertain the
possibility that no such standards exist,
If the conclusions of the preceding paragraph are accepted, there
would seem to remain only two supportable general policies towards
predatory pricing. One could follow Bork (1978, pp. 154-5) and simply
drop such conduct from the list of practices with which antitrust is
concerned, If predatory pricing is in fact very rare, and if courts
always have considerable difficulty distinguishing it from vigorous but
innocent competition, this may be the safest route, The economic case
for this policy is strengthened if one fears that courts, confronted
difficult decisions, are likely to err in the direction of protecting
competitors, not competition.41
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But there are problems with this prescription, It is hard to
believe that the apparent infrequency with which predatory pricing
is attempted is totally unrelated to the courts' hostility to it and
the propensity of small firms to allege it. Further, not all cases
of alleged predatory pricing are identical; error must be more likely
in some than in others. It is at least plausible that removal of
predatory pricing from the list of proscribed practices would result
in the occurance of some cases that any reasonable being would be able
to distinguish from innocent competition.
If, for these or other reasons, it is decided that predatory pricing
cannot simply be declared lawful, there would appear to remain only one
economically defensible general policy choice: Scherer's (1976a) proposal
that courts follow a "rule of reason" approach and perform "a thorough
examination of the factual circumstances accompanying the monopolist's
alleged predatory behavior, how the monopolist's officials perceived the
probable effects of its behavior (i.e., intent), and the structural
consequences actually flowing from that behavior."42 Scherer's suggestion
that the only defensible policy here must involve, in effect, long-run
cost/benefit analysis has been attacked by a number of writers as unwieldy
and unworkable.4 3 But I think that Scherer's answer to such criticism
is compelling:44
·..just about any important Sherman Act, Section
2 or Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 5
monopolization case entails discovery and trial
costs running into the millions of dollars, If,
despite such vast outlays, the existing adjudica-
tive system cannot cope with complex .., questions,
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the solution, I contend, is not to adopt oversimplified
rules of thumb that it can handle, Rather, a new
and better system should be devised.
In any event, Judge Hanscom in Realemon did perform a "rule of
reason" analysis. As was noted above, he determined that Realemon had
monopoly power, largely on the basis of its share of "the relevant
market". He deduced from documentary evidence that it had exhibited
intent to maintain and preserve its monopoly. He found that it had
used discriminatory price differentials among different areas and
"unreasonably low prices" to this end. Since its share of the processed
lemon juice "market" was still a healthy 75% in 1974, he concluded that
Realemon had in fact maintained its monopoly position as it had intended
to do, Intent, actions, aid effects were then added to establish a
violation of the law,
I do not think that the issues involved here are simple, but I am
convinced that the analytical approach (implicit model) employed in the
Initial Decision is not the best way to resolve them. It seems clear
that Realemon was a lucrative operation and that its management felt that
its long-run profitability could be enhanced by price moves directed
at Golden Crown; one need not define markets or compute market shares
to reach this conclusion. Given Realemon's superior status in the minds
of consumers, it might plausibly have felt that its price reductions,
to or below its average total cost, would cause serious injury to Golden
Crown, It is hard to know whether Realemon management did expect or
might plausibly have expected that Golden Crown would either substantially
retrench its operations or drop out of the industry. In any event,
it did neither; its share continued to grow and the terms of its sale
to Seven-Up in late 1974 would seem to indicate that at least one firm
estimated that it had accumulated positive "goodwill" in the process.
The growth of Golden Crown, in spite of Realemon's actions, when
considered in light of the circumstances surrounding its sale, suggests
that whatever Realemon's intent or expectations, it did not manage to
reduce the effecitve rivalry it faced,
The Initial Decision (p. 134-6) focuses on Realemonts substantial
market share in 1974 as evidence of its continuing dominance, This
seems to me to reflect capture by models in which market share is given
excessive weight as a measure of monopoly power, I would place much
more stress on Realemon's rapid loss of share in the 1970 - 1974 period.
In any case, if Realemon's initial expectations of success were influenced
by its likely better access to liquid capital than Golden Crown, the
sale of the latter to Seven-Up would surely hve altered those expectations.
There is no question but that Golden Crown would have been better
off if Realemon had not engaged in the price and discount policies complained
of. In deciding that Realemon's prices were "unreasonably low'> the judge
relied on Golden Crown's costs as a benchmark,45 This comes close to
the application of what Williamson (1977, p, 328) terms "a naked theory
of umbrella pricing - in order to ensure the viability of a new entrant,
the dominant firm is expected to maintain price," I agree with him that
such a standard is generally unacceptable; it is biased against `Inocent,
competitive price reductions that would benefit buyers. But I do not thinr
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that the judge's concerns here are only appropriate under "a naked theory
of umbrella pricing"; the dynamic efficiency issues raised above may
also underlie it.
This review of intent and effect does not establish beyond doubt
whether or not Realemon's pricing was predatory or constituted monopoli-
zation, In cases like this, where the economic analysis permits no definite
conclusion (and these mutt be the majority of cases), it would seem
appropriate to heed the warnings of Areeda and Turner (1975, p, 699),
Bork (1978, pp, 154-5), and others about the dangers of inhibiting
competition and find for respondent, Some of the strong language in
Realemon. documents introduced by complaint counsel to establish intent
might make this difficult to do, but in the absence of intent to do much
more than recoup losses and check a rival's expansion, and with no
evidence that these goals were achieved, dismissal of charges seems
warranted, One can, I think, sensibly couple Scherer's rule of reasnn with
Bork's strong presumption of innocence,
5. The Design of Relief: Trademark Licensing
In fact, Judge Hanscom did not dismiss the charges against Realemon.
Having found that it had monopolized, he turned to the question of relief.
He began with the observation, "In a monopolization' case, adequate
relief must put an end to the monopoly position, and break up or render
impotent the monopoly power found to have been preserved and maintained
in violation of law." 4 6 Immediately after stating that a cease and desist
order would hardly accomplish this end, he declared as follows;
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The heart of the monopoly power preserved and
maintained by respondent Borden lies in the'
Realemon trademark and its dominant market
position, For competition to enter the pro-
cessed lemon juice industry, the barrier to
entry which inheres in the Realemon trademark
must be eliminated. As a consequence, in the
judgement of the undersigned, the only effective
relief under the facts shown by the record in this
case requires the licensing of the Realemon brand
name, to others wishing to enter the production,
marketing and sale of processed lemon juice.
As Section 2, above, noted, the order attached to the Initial Decision
called for compulsory licensing of the Realemon mark for a period of
ten years, at rates intended only to cover Borden's costs of ensuring
adequate quality control.
However one might feel about the proper role of economic analysis
in the determination of the legal status of particular acts or practices,
it seems clear that some economic theory must be relied upon when relief
of this sort is imposed, If the objective of such structural relief is
to improve economic performance, rather than to punish offenders, the design of
relief must be based on an economic model that predicts that more
efficient resource use will flow from the announced order. In this
section, I hope first to show that no satisfactory model of this sort was
employed to analyze the relief ordered in Realemon, I than sketch an
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economic analysis of the role of the Realemon trademark and indicate
some of its consequences. Though.the analysis may be of some general
interest, I intend it mainly to be illustrative of the importance.of
integrating the central facts in any individual case into.a coherent model
before prescribing structural change.
It seems apparent that in markets in whichthey both competed,
Realemon's trademark provided its main advantage (probably its only
significant advantage) over Golden Crown, The Initial Decision describes
at length the widespread acceptance of the Realemon name, terming it
(p. 59) "virtually the generic name for bottled lemon juice", The
price differentials that Realemon could charge, apparently entirely
because of the strength of its "consumer franchise", are noted. This
premium brand status is simply described (p, 60) as having been "created
by a number of factors including advertising and promotion
over the years", This, I would argue, is hardly an adequate model of
the source of the Realemon mark's status or value.48 Similarly, the
conclusion (p. 77) that Realemon's trademark was an important source
of its power to exclude competition is apparently based on its historic
price premium and on expert testimony characterizing it (p. 72) as "a
successfully differentiated product",
But the latter term comes to little more than a statement that
consumers perceived Realemon to be different from other brands (thus
"differentiated") and in fact superior to them (thus "successfully
differentiated"), Surely the basic character of the differentiation
involved is not the same in all situations in which consumers perceive
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differences. Ready-to-eat breakfast cereals clearly form a class of
"differentiated products", for instance, But different brands of cereal
do seem to differ in ways perceptible by and important to consumers, while
competing brands of lemon juice are apparently identical, Substantial
perceived differences in the face of actual product homogeneity would
seem to imply the importance of the sort of consumer information problems
discussed by Holton (1970); it is not obvious that such problems are central
to the functioning of the breakfast cereal market, Different brands of
breakfast cereals appeal to different segments of the population, while
there is no segmentation here, There are many brands of cereal produced
-by the leading firms, but only a very few brands of processed lemon juice
in any region, Advertising and product development are apparently much
more important in the breakfast cereal industry than in the processed
lemon juice industry. To lump these product categories along with
other that differ from both in major ways under the single heading of
"'differentiated products" is to mistake a call for analysis for the
results thereof. As the comparison of these two industries indicates,
"product differentiation" takes many forms; there is no reason at all
to suppose that they can all be adequately comprehended by any single
model.49
Any model that predicts that Realemon's trademark provides it
with substantial long-run monopoly power must show how possession of
that mark gives the firm a relatively long-lived advantage over its
actual and potential rivals, one that they would find it more expensive
50
to overcQme than Realemlon found it to acquire, A showing that Realemon
II
-47-
commanded a premium price over some period does not suffice to do this.
Suppose, for instance, that the premium were due simply to the fact that
only Realemon had done non-trivial amounts of advertising, and suppose
further that it could be erased totally and permanently by an advertising
outlay of, say, $1 million spread over two years. It would be hard,
under these assumptions, to argue that Realemon had much of a long-run
advantage, Similarly, a showing that Realemon's production costs were
lower than those of Golden Crown because the former had a much more
efficient bottling line would not establish a serious obstacle to effec-
tive competition; one would have to go further and show that it would
somehow have been unusually difficult for Golden Crown to have acquired
an equally efficient line.
I do not disagree with the proposition that the Realemon mark
gave its holder a short-run advantage over Golden Crown and others. My
point is that this does not establish the presence of an important long-run
advantage that would serve significantly to inhibit effective competition,
One needs a model that indicates how Realemon's advantage was obtained
and that says something about the difficulties, if any, that rivals would
face in attempting to overcome that advantage,
One might, for instance, assert that "Realemon" aimply happened
to be a name endowed with certain magical properties in this area, that
it was for some reason impossible for consumers to resist buying lemon-
based products to which that name was affixed, But Borden's apparent
lack of success with products other than reconstituted lemon juice that
bore the Realeqn name would seem to dispose of this possibility, 51
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Similarly, one might follow Chamberlin (1962; pp, 57-62, 270-4) and
argue that trademarks are analytically indistinguishable from patents:
both provide monopoly power, but trademarks can last much longer. Chamberlin
would permit much of what is now condemned as trademark infringement on
the grounds that it erodes monopoly. He would favor more extensive
use of legislated quality standards to perform the consumer protection
function of trademarks in certain industries, At the most, he would give
trademark protection a limited duration, around five years (p, 274). If
one accepts this. point of view, it would seem to follow directly that any
device, even a Federal Trade Commission Act, Section S monopolization
proceeding, that enabled one to end important trademark protection of
the sort enjoyed by Realemon should be siezed upon, While there is clearly
something to the analogy between patents and trademarks, I doubt that
most contemporary economists share Chamberlin's extreme hostility toward
the latter, The information provision role of trademarks cannot be
dismissed lightly. But if all trademarks are not be be attacked, one
still needs a model that either singles out "Realemon" for special
treatment or shows that it should not be so singled out,
It seems apparent that the "action" here is on the demand side;
in order to understand the determinants of the value of the "Realemon"
mark, one must have an appropriate model of consumer behavior, Some hints
as to the nature of such a model are given by documents and testimony cited
in the Initial Decision. A survey of consumer attitudes (p. 62) concluded
that consumers "see Realemon as the brand that is proven and reliable
and has captured their brand loyalty," A former Realemon regional sales
manager stated (p. 62), "Realemon was first in the business and over a
long period of years they had established a very dominant consumer and
trade-wise acceptance." The Grocery Buyer for the leading chain in
Buffalo noted(p, 64) that Realemon "is the product that customers have
used for years,and they are familiar with it." Finally, the Grocery
Buyer for a Wisconsin-based chain generalized (p, 65) that, "The first
in, that constantly promotes their own name themselves, seems to almost
create a brand identity in the consumer's mind that she just can't get
out of it." A common thread running through these and similar statements
is that consumers' long experience with Realemon had a good deal to do
with that brand's premium status.
There are a number of mechanisms that one might invoke to link
experience to preferences, Studies by Allison and Uhl (1964), White
(1966, pp. 102-3), and others have found that product labeling can affect
experienced product performance. It is somewhat difficult to reconcile
this effect with either broad or narrow definitions of buyer rationality
(Simon 978), but in any case it is not obvious that consumers' perceptions
of the qualities of competing brands of processed lemon juice were distorted
in major ways, The study of consumer attitudes cited above noted that
"no differences were mentioned between Realemon and the other products."52
A more appealing mechanism, perfectly consistent with consumer
rationality, is suggested by Bauer's (1960) interesting discussion of the
risk-taking involved in consumer behavior, Bauer notes that any purchase
act has an enormous number of possible consequences, the relative likelihoods
of which cannot be calculated by boundedly rational humans, (Can a "bad"
A
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bottle of lemon juice kill you? Can it cause cancer? Can it give bad
breath? How might one value or attach subjective probabilities to these
sorts of events?) Bauer points out that "brand loyalty", in the generalized
sense of forming a strong attachment to a brand with which one has had
satisfactory experience, perhaps by being willing to pay a premium price
for it, can be a sensible way of reducing perceived risk.
53 He provides
illustrative anecdotal evidence of stronger loyalty to particular brands
of sugar among frequent bakers, for whom the consequences of using an
unsatisfactory sugar might be severe, than among housewives who do not
bake often, Subsequently, Cunningham (1967) found a strong positive
association between the risk that individuals associated with particular
product classes and the strength df-their expressed preference for their
favorite brand in each clasps Roselius (1971) found that consumers
generally ranked brand loyalty (i.e., buying a favorite brand) well above
a number of other methods of risk-reduction (e.g., buying the most expen-
sive brand), Sheth and Venkatesan (1968) found that as experience with a
product class grew (in an experimental setting), brand loyalty became the
dominant risk-reduction device employed.54
Not only has the Bauer hypothesisjthat perceived risk leads to
the formation of loyalty toward a brand with which one has had favorable
experience, stood up to direct testing, it is consistent with a good deal
of apparently unrelated theory and evidence, It is, in particular,
consistent with hyper-rational consumer behavior of the sort usually
assumed by economists, The Appendix sketches a ver-y simple model, in which
buyers know the laws of probability and properly cc.,. ute the relevant
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expectations, that predicts brand loyalty as a consequence of uncertain
product performance. Rational consumers who have had experience with the
first brand of a particular type may decide not even to try a second brand
introduced at the same (or even a somewhat lower) price and of equal
ex ante attractiveness. Once the first brand has been used, continuing
to buy it involves less risk than trying a new brand, and trial will
occur only if the expected gains are sufficiently large, In the model in
the Appendix, the first brand on the market obtains a lasting advantage,
which is more substantial the more averse consumers are to the risks
involved.
On the empirical side, one can point to the recent study by Bond
and Lean (1977) of two drug markets, which concluded (p. 76) that:
,., strong preferences are revealed for brands that
are the first of their kind to appear on the market.
These preferences wane only slowly over time,..
[P]hysicians can be persuaded to prescribe late
entering brands if these brands offer some therapeutic
gain useful to a subset of patients,
The authors note that these first-brand preferences cannot be explained
by differences in advertising or promotional spending, Given physicians'
insensitivity to drug prices and the riskiness that must be associated,
subjectively at least, with prescribing a new drug, this form of brand
loyalty is easily explained as risk-reducing behavior. Buzzell and Farris
(1976) find somewhat weaker evidence of early-brand advantages Cand late-brand
disadvantages) in marketing costs across a wide range of consumer goods.
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Peckham (1966) expresses the conventional wisdom, consistent with the
quotation above, that it is much more difficult to market an imitative
("me-tQo") brand than one differing from others already being sold. In
experiments with neutrally-labeled (e.g., "Brand H") but physically
identical "brands" of bread and beer, Tucker (1974) and McConnell (1968),
respectively, found that subjects were willing to pay a premium to
continue consuming "brands" with which they had acquired experience.
The parallel with the processed lemon juice market seems apparent, as
does the broad consistency of such behavior with a risk-avoidance model.
All of this at least suggests that it is plausible to think of the
main cause of the observed premium that consumers were willing to pay for
the Realemon name as being their greater experience with that brand than
with other brands, Those other brands were then rationally (at least
in the broad sense in which this term is use outside of economics) viewed
as riskier alternatives. This is almost certainly an incomplete model of
consumer behavior in this market.55 But all models of reality, by defini-
tion, are incomplete, The real issue is whether the assumptions or pre-
dictions of the risk-avoidance model are inconsistent with the facts of
the case, That issue clearly cannot be definitively settled here. Had
the trial in Realemon explicitly considered alternative models of the
source of the value of the "Realemon" trademark, we might have more
relevant information, but it did not,
In any case, let me assume the correctness of this framework and
consider some of its implications. As I argued above, what matters is
not the price premium that buyers are willing to pay for Realemon at any
III
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instant, but rather the difficulty that an entrant would have in eroding
it. The risk-avoidance model suggests the relative longevity of the
fist brand's advantage vis vis later "me-too" entrants, but it does
not establish the magnitude of that advantage.
One might conjecture, for instance, that processed lemon juice
purchases are not viewed as particularly risky by constumnrs, so the advantage
should be small, But this is not obvious; lemon juice is often used
as an ingredient in various dishes, so that a bad bottle of lemon juice
could ruin n expensive meal prepared for important guests, Robertson
(1973) reports that in at least one small sample, food purchases were
rated only slightly (and insignificantly) less risky than purchases of
clothing or appliances.
Even if one takes the view that the (average) perceived risk at
any instant is measured by the Realemon price premium, historically sub-
stantial relative to the cost of a bottle of lemon juice, there still
remains the question of how easily that premium could be eroded, Demsetz'
(1962) study of frozen orange juice, for instance, seemed to indicate that
buyer experience rather rapidly eroded loyalty to premium-priced national
brands of that product, One might infer similar ease of erosion here,
but the long period of Realemon's dominance makes that inference suspect.
The rapid rise in Golden Crown's share, coupled with its purchase by
Seven-Up, would seem to point to the same direction, however, since it
would appear that with a reasonably modest investment, Golden Crown managed
to make substantial inroads, But this doesn't really settle the matter
either, One would like to know how the premium that Realemon commanded
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varied with consumer experience with Golden Crown. If it were totally
erased by one purchase of Golden Crown, and if Golden Crown could obtain
trial relatively cheaply, then Realemon's long-run advantage would be
minimal, On the other hand, if Realemon's premium were.not materially
lessened in areas in which Golden Crown attained a large share, or if
detailed studies showed that years of using Golden Crown were required
to erase preference for Realemon at identical pricest Realemon's advantage
would seem to be substantial, In any case, empirical work relating the
strength of loyalty to Realemon to the penetration of Golden Crown could
have calibrated the risk-avoidance model by indicating the real, long-run
importance of Realemon's advantage, but apparently no such work was done,
We are thus left with only the main qualitative implication of the
risk-avoidance model: consumers' experience with Realemon gives it some
long-lived advantage, This supports the conclusion in the Initial Decision
,that the "Realemon" trademark is at the hart of the firm's long-run mono-
poly power, but it avoids the near-tautology involved in such a statement
by indicating the source of that power and the trademark's value, Further,
since the risk apparently attached by buyers to Golden Crown and other
"low-priced" brands reflects ignorance of the apparent homogeneity of all
brands of bottled reconstituted lemon juice, there is a clear market
failure of the sort economists are used to dealing with.5 6 (If the source
of Realemon's premium brand status lay in consumer perceptions that it
tasted better than other brands, it could be argued that the problem was
irrationality, not ignorance, If consumers are irrational in any deep
sense, the welfare"economic case for competition breaks down,)
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The usual remedy for ignorance is information provision, Golden
Crown, by seeking to persuade customers to try its product, was attempting
to provide information. If one accepts the decision that Realemon
"monopolized", it follows that Realemon was hindering the provision of
information in an unacceptable fashion. If there is no way to prevent
Realemon from continuing to do this, a logical remedy is force information
provision, In priniciple, this could be done via government-financed
or Borden-financed advertising to the effect that all brands of reconsti-
tuted lemon juice are chemically identical, But unless some sort of
quality standards are imposed on all producers of reconstituted lemon
juice, by the FTC or some other entity, this "information" might in fact
be misleading, Golden Crown, after all, did adulterate its product,
though the adulterations were apparently indetectable.) Moreover, as
Holton (1970) and others have stressed, consumers do not have infinite
capacity for information processing. Information is more likely to affect
decisions the more easily it can be understood and employed.
A trademark provides a good deal of information quickly to one who
has experience with it, It can thus be argued that the trademark licensing
relief ordered in the Initial Decision, with the associated quality
control provisions, is an efficient way to transmit information to
consumers, the lack of which is at the root of the apparent market
failure here, Thus, if relief is needed in this case, the relief actually
ordered seems appropriate. I do not think, however, that one can defensibly
reach this conclusion simply by asserting, "The heart of the monopoly
power preserved and maintained by respondent Borden lies in the Realemon
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trademark and its dominant market position," 57 A careful selection and
examination of an economic model appropriate to the situation involved
is required.58
6. Summary and Conclusions
Through an examination of the major issues in a recent case, this
essay has attempted to shed some light on the appropriate use of economic
analysis in antitrust, The logical impossibility of avoiding the selection
of an appropriate economic model or models in this context is, I hope,
clear. If model selection is not done explicitly, the model employed
in any particular decision or analysis emerges as that model or class
of models that supports the conclusions reached, In situations in which
the appropriate economic model is not obvious, and these can hardly be
uncommon, failure to face the selection problem explicitly serves to
make error more likely,
In Section 3, I attempted to show that the importance attached
to the market definition -- market share exercise in Realemon reflected
the implicit selection of a restrictive class of models. The debate
surrounding the definition of "the relevant market" serves to point up
the difficulty of bending those models to fit the facts in this case.
I argued that at best, such exercises can give some information on short-
run monopoly power, but that better information may be obtained through
analysis of profitability, Moreover, market definition -- market share
exercises can shed no light at all on long-run monopoly power, the power
to prevent the erosion of profits through more intense rivalry, unless
III
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one adopts a particularly limited form of the difficult-to-defend "size
is power" model.5 9
Section 4 considered appropriate tests for predatory pricing,
both in general and in Realemon. It was shown there that the apparently
simple rules proposed in recent years by several authors are not in fact
simple to apply to Realemon. Moreover, they are either derived from
welfare-economic arguments with internal problems or from economic models
that cannot claim universal applicability, Since selection of a per se
test for predatory pricing amounts to a judgement that the economic model
from which it was derived is applicable to the case at hand, and since
no models that yield simple tests are likely to be universally applicable,
this discussion indicated that the choice of a general policy in this
area must be between a "hands off" approach and a "rule of reason" analysis,
It was also noted, in the discussion of Realemon, that these could be
sensibly joined by establishing a strong presumption that observed pricing
practices are innocent until proven to be otherwise by an examination of
the facts involved,
Sedtion 5 considered the relief ordered in the Initial Decision
in Realemon, That relief sought to change the industry's performance
by altering an important element of industry structure, Such relief must
logically derive from an economic model of the situation considered, since
a prediction of improved performance clearly cannot be based on facts
alone. An illustrative analysis of the role of the "Realemon" trade-
mark was offered, which tended to provide support for the trademark
licensing relief ordered. But it is important to note that no such
analysis seems to have underlain the Initial Decision: a decision to
attack respondent's trademark was based on little more than observation
of its widespread acceptance and apparent short-run competitive importance,
The point of focusing on Realemon was not to show that the Initial
Decision was wrong or incompetent by prevailing standards. On the contrary,
the Administrative Law Judge seems to have dealt with the issues before him
in relatively standard ways. This, along with the inherent interest of the
main issues in the case, permitted the sort of critical analysis attempted
here. My goal has not been to attack or defend the Initial Decision, but
rather to focus attention on the ways in which antitrust cases have traditionally
been decided. The Realemon case may involve more complex economic issues
than many other cases, but it seems unlikely that it is truly exceptional in
this regard. If reliance on the implications of a set of economic models
that were never explicitly evaluated in light of the facts at hand led to
problems in Realemon, as I have argued it did, it would seem hard to doubt
that this standard approach produces inadequate analysis in other cases as
well. If antitrust is to become a more consistent force for economic
efficiency, it would thus appear that the selection and analysis of appropriate
economic models must be more frequently incorporated into antitrust proceedings.
This would require more use of the tools of economic theory, which in turn
would alter the tasks and roles of both lawyers and economists.
-.58-
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Appendix: Rational Brand Loyalty
Suppose that a new product, R, apparently different from anything
on the market, is developed and introduced at price P. Buyers are
uncertain how much a unit of R will be worth to them until they have
tried it, For simplicity, it is assumed that R is what Nelson (1970)
calls an experience good; no quality information can be ascertained
prior to purchase, but complete information is provided by a single
trial. Let us assume that Rs "value" can be measured in dollar terms.
Before trying the product, each individual's subjective distribution of
its value to him is assumed for simplicity to be uniform between zero
and X. It is also assumed that this is the correct distribution on
average, That is, the objective distribution of actual values of R
across members of the population is also uniform between zero and X,
Another way of looking at this is to suppose that each individual knows
the distribution of values for the population as a whole but is completely
ignorant as to where his own experience will place him in that distribution.
I might know, for instance, that R is worth at least $10 to 10% of the
population but have no idea before trying it whether I will fall in that
10%. (A very large population is assumed throughout, so that distributions
can be treated as continuous,) Let x be the actual value of R experienced
by a typical buyer,
Let us initially assume risk-neutrality, Then as long as the
random variable (x - P) has a non-negative expectation, all consumers
will try R once, If we define by P/X = -a, then trial by all will occur
as long as c 1/2, and a fraction a of the population will continue
purchasing R, after having tried it,
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Now let a second prQduct, G, be introduced, %t is clear to all
that G and R are members of the same product class, such as bottled
reconstituted lemon juice or freeze-dried instant coffee, There is
no (visible) claim that G has attributes lacked by R or that is lacks
any of Rs characteristics, In marketing terminology, G is a "me-too"
product, Buyers thus view their choices as G, R, or neither; there is
no point to buying both G and R. Suppose the price of G is also set
at P and that, unknown to consumers in advance, G and R are in fact
identical.
In one extreme case, consumers might simply assume that, in the
absence f any apparent differences, G and R are identical, They would
thus assume that their experience with R applies perfectly to G, Since
the products, by assumption, sell for the same price, each can expect to
capture half of total sales, But this is surely a very extreme case; one
must doubt that consumers always assume in the absence of any information
to the contrary that all products in the same narrow product class are
identical, Some generalization of this sort probably occurs, of course.
That is, consumers who have tied R are likely to act as if they knew
more about G than if they had never seen any product in the relevant class
before, But as long as such generalization is not, complete, as long as
some residual uncertainty attaches to the worth of G even after R has
been tried, some light on behavior may be shed by considering the polar
case of no generalization,
Let us examine that case, still assuming risk-neutrality, Assume
that each consumer takes the worth of G to him, call it y, as a random
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variable uniformly distributed between zero and X, regardless of his
experience with R, Thus G is felt to be exactly as risky, ex ante,
as R was. (This is an extreme case, of course; one might expect high
experienced x to imply high expected y, since individuals' tastes are
the stochastic element here,) On these assumptions, the fraction (l-a)
of consumers who tried R and then decided not to buy it will also try
G and, since the products are identical, reject it, The remaining 100a%
of the population is already buying R, These individuals face a choice
between continuing to purchase R, and receiving a net benefit of (x-P)
each time for sure, or trying G, Ex ante, each consumer assigns some
probability to the event that G is better for him than R; trial of G
essentially buys him the option of switching to the better product if this
event occurs,
We can ignore the cost stream associated with the individual's
purchase sequence, since it will be identical whether or not G is tried
or selected, Let (l+r) be the discount factor applied to benefits
generated by successive purchases, Let fy) and F(y) be, respectively,
the density and distribution functions of the random variable y, the
value of G to the consumer considered. Then a consumer purchasing R and
receiving "value" x will elect not to try G if and only if the following
inequality is satisfied:
X X f(y)
x[(l+r)/r > fyf(y)dy + F(x)x(l/r) + (l/r)[l-F(x)]fy[l-F(x)]dy. (Al)
0 x
The term on the left is the capitalized value of benefits from remaining
with R. The first term on the right is the expected gain from the initial
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trial of G, The second term is the probability that y is revealed to
be no greater than x, times the capitalized benefit from.returning to
R after trying G once, The third term is the probability that exceeds
x, times the capitalized expected value of , conditional on its exceeding
x.
Under the assumption of a uniform distribution, f(y) = l/X, and
F(y) = x/X, for 0 y X, Substituting into (Al), integrating, and
collecting and simplifying terms, the condition for not trying G at all
becomes
(x/X)2 2r(x/X) +(lfr) ~ 0. (A2)
It is easy to show that as long as r is positive, this inequality will
be satisfied for x sufficiently close to X, Customers who are very
satisfied with R, in the sense that they attach sufficiently low
probability to the existence of a better brand, rationally decide not
to wry G, even though they attach no disutility to the risk such trial
invoives, Solving A2), and focusing on the relevant root, one obtains
the fraction, y, of the population that does not try G as
Y i /r-(l+r) - r. (A3)
or r ,01, about 9% of the total population does not try G, while for
r = .10, Y .23, If the two products are identical, and if consumers
who have tried both divide their purchases evenly, R sells to a fraction
(a+y)/2 of the population, while G sells to (-Y)/2.
In this model, G and R are identical and are recognized as such
by all who try both, They sell at the same price and before trial they
II
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are viewed as equally risky. Yet the first brand in obtains a lasting
advantage. In this setup, G could induce more trial by lowering its
price, If the price decrease were perceived as temporary, however, it
might have to be quite large in order to have a signficant impact, since
it would, in effect, only increase the first term on the left of (Al),
the term giving the expected value of the initial trial, On the other
hand, since G and R are by assumption identical, one might expect R's
advantage to erode over time, if only through word-of-mouth communication
between those who initially tried G and those who decided not to.
It is of some interest to see what happens if the two products
are not identical, Again, a simple polar case is of some illustrative
value. Suppose now that for the population as a whole, the true values
of x and y are independently, identically, and uniformly distributed
over the range tO,XJ. That is, it is now possible for an individual
to value R highly and not care at all for G, or vice versa. This means
that consumers' expectation. that the distribution of is independent of
their experienced x is now correct. Then it is relatively straightforward
to show that the first brand's advantage is still present, though it is
smaller.
Of the fraction (1-A) of the population that tried R and decided
notjto buy it, a fraction A will decide to buy G when they try it, since
that is the probability that the y experienced exceeds P, A fraction y
will remain with R and not try G, as before, If a consumer is buying
R and receiving value x, the probability that trying G will induce a
shift to that brand because y > x is easily seen to be (1 - x/X). Then
4,
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the fraction of the population that switches to G is given by
(1-X)x 2 2
f (1 - /X) (/X)dx = ( - Y )/2. (A4)
P
(The fraction of the population that could switch is (a-y), so that G
captures a fraction (+y)/2 of them.) Adding things up, the fractions
of the population to which each brand sells are as follows:
2 2 2 2R: A- C( +2)/2, G: a- (C2 -y)/2,
The fraction of the population buying R exceeds that buying G by y;
the difference is easily seen to be y in the case where the brands are
identical, Note that when expectations are correct, G's entry causes the
total fraction buying to rise from a to a(2-a), In spite of this, G's
sales can be less than half R's pre-entry sales if y2 exceeds (l-a).
Thus, in this example of "true" differentiation, the first brand
in again has an advantage over the second, The advantage is smaller, but
there is now less reason to expect its erosion. Though G and R are of
equal value on average, consumers initially electing not to try G will
receive conflicting reports of its relative quality from those who have
tried both.
A second interesting extension of the basic model is to allow
consumers to be averse to risk. I want to show that risk-aversion increases
the strength of the effect found above; a risk-averter purchasing R
will be less likely than a risk-neutral individual to try G, all else
equal. To capture the effects of risk-aversion, let us suppose that the
dollar value of the net gain from consuming R or G at price P is given by
II
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U(z), where z - x if R is purchased and z = y if G is bought instead,
with U a strictly concave, increasing function.
and
If an individual finds R to be worth x is purchasing R, a slight
generalization of (Al) indicate+that this individual will try G if
and only if the following inequality holds:
X X
TU(x) = r U(y)f(y)dy + [l-F(x)] U(y)fx(Y)dy - [l+r-F(x)]U(x) > 0, (A5)
0 x
where f (y) = f(y)/[l-F(x)], x < y < X.
If the consumer were risk-neutral, the test inequality would be simply
T(x) - ry + [l-F'(x)]y x - [l+r-F(x)]x > 0, (A6)
X X
where y = fyf(y)dy, and x = fyfx(y)dy.
O x0 x
Recalling that x is some particular constant for each consumer, we
can re-scale U without loss of generality for any particular consumer so
that U(x) x, Exploiting the concavity of U, we have
TU(x) < rU(y) + [l-F(x)]U(yx) - [l+r-F(x)]x
< r[x + U(x)(C - x)] + [1-F(x)][x + U(x)(yx-x)]-[l+r-F(x)]x
= U'(x)T(x).
Thus, if T(x) is negative, so that a risk-neutral individual experiencing
value x from brand R would not try G, a risk-averse individual with the
same experience and the same expectations about G's value will not try it
either. Moreover, it T(x) is positive but sufficiently small, Tu(x) will
be negative; risk-aversion will cause some individuals who would have tried
.1
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G rationally to decide not to do so, It should be clear from this latter
proof, which did not require any assumptions about the shape of f(y),
that the earlier use of uniform and identical distributions merely served
to simplify expostion; the qualitative results did not depend on the
shapes of the distributions involved,
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Footnotes
In writing this paper I have been helped in various ways by Paul Joskow,
Alvin Silk, Oliver Williamson, and especially, Michael Glassman, though
none of them can be held liable for defects in the final product.
1. Docket No, 8978. Realemon Foods is operated as part of Borden's
Borden Foods Division. As of this writing, the Commission has yet
to announce its decision on Borden's appeal of the initial decision
of the FTC's administrative law judge.
2. For the sake of making my prejudices explicit, I should note that
I find persuasive the arguments of Posner (1976) and Bork (978)
that economic efficiency should be the only objective of antitrust.
3. A leading example is the "foreclosure" model that guides current
policy toward vertical mergers; see, for instance, Peltzman (1969)
and Bork (1976, ch, 11).
4. For an example of the latter, see Schmalensee (1978).
5. This document, filed August 19, 1976 under Docket No, 8978, will
hereinafter generally be referred to simply as the Initial Decision.
6. Except where noted, these are based on the Initial Decision.
Submissions of complaint counsel or respondent are used only for
elaborations of points either not at issue or resolved by the
Initial Decision.
7. Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent,
Borden, Inc,, dated April 9, 1976, pp. 22-23,
8. In 1973, total sales of reconstituted lemon juice were about $25
million, while sales of fresh lemons were about $200 million. If
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these were combined, Realemon's 90% dollar share would fall to around
8%, On a per-ounce basis, Realemon sold for around one quarter the
price of juice from fresh lemons in the early 1970's. (There was
considerable variation around this multiple,) This implies, along
with the foregoing, that a 90% share of reconstituted lemon juice
sales in ounces would translate to about a 27% share of the larger
market, Since the relative share of lemons in the larger market
was apparently falling during the 1960's these figures based on
early 1970's data are probably upper bounds.
9, Initial Decision, p. 99; quotation from a Realemon employee.
10, Initial Decision, p, 99; quotation from a Sunkist employee,
11. Testimony of H, Michael Mann, cited in Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law of Respondent, Borden, Inc., dated April 9, 1976,
p, 111.
12, Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, Filed by
complaint counsel on April 13, 1976, pp. 33-4.
13, Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent, Borden,
Inc., dated April 9, 1976, pp, 107-9.
14. Initial Decision, p. 7.
15. Initial Decision, p. 130,
16, Answering Brief of Complaint Counsel in Response to Appeal Brief of
Borden, Inc,, and in Support of the Initial Decision of the Administrative
Law Judge, filed January 14, 1977, pp. 25-26. This leaves out contingent
Vaymentstof up to $1,75 million that Seven-Up was to make to G.C. Citrus
if returns on Golden Crown exceeded certain thresholds, As of September,
II
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1978, Seven-Up was still marketing Golden Crown reconstituted lemon
juice in the Boston area, at least,
17. Initial Decision, p. 162,
18. The standard citation, given in this context on page 151 of the
Initial Decision, is Learned Hand's dictum in Alcoa; United States
v,. Aluminum Co, of America, 148, F,2d 416, 424 (2nd Cir. 1945).
19. It is at the core of Mason's (1937) famous distinction between the
legal and economic meanings of monopoly, The former, stressing the
power to exclude rivals, corresponds to what is termed long-run mono-
poly power in the text, while the latter, stressing market structure
at any instant, corresponds to short-run power over price.
20. For a discussion of demand elasticity estimation as an alternative
to market definition, see Posner (1976, p, 125),
21. Similarly, short-run monopoly power need not imply excess profits
since one can have an iron-clad monopoly over something that nobody
will buy unless price is below production cost. Such situations will
be missed by a profits test, but this is no great problem: to reduce
the short-run monopoly power of a firm earning no excess profit is
to drive it from the market, and this can result in a net efficiency
loss by depriving buyers of a product not available elsewhere: see
Schmalensee (1978, pp. 319-21) and the references there cited.
22. On these problems, see Weiss (1974), who notes that a massive amount
of empirical work simply takes accounting profitability as a measure
of exercised monopoly power,
-74-
23. It is possible for an unprofitable firm to have the power to exclude
new competition. But this power will never become visible, since
low profits by themselves would serve to discourage potential entrants.
24, See, for instance, Bain (1956, pp. 21-5).
25, For an example of this sort of analysis, see Schmalensee (1978).
26. Alfred Marshall (1922, Bk, V, Ch, 1) provides a lucid and still useful
discussion of the principles involved, It is worth noting that there
seems to be no mention in Marshall (1922) of the aggregation of
physically distinct goods into a single market, Modern microeconomic
theory texts generally do not consider this possibility either,
27, Dropping subscripts for the moment, let q be the output of some firm,
and let q be the aggregate output of its rivals, If Q = q + q, the
assumption of homogeneous outputs means that market price, P, must
be a (decreasing) function of Q, In order to maximize its profit for
any given , the firm considered must choose q so that marginal cost,
MC, equals the partial derivative of the firm's total revenue,
qP(q+q), with respect to q. The latter quantity can be written as
P[1 - (q/QE)], where E, the market demand elasticity, is given by
-P/(QP'), Equation (2), with si = q/Q then follows directly,
28. See,fo: instance, Scherer (1970, pp. 52-7), the references he cites,
and Weiss (1974). Posner (1976, pp. 125-33) provides a useful critical
discussion of market definition in antitrust,
29. See, again, Weiss (1974),
30. Initial Decision, page 50, This is the first sentence of the first
Finding of Fact under the general heading "Monopoly Power",
II
-75-
31. On the difficulty of defining a good measure of substitutability or
complimentarity at the household level, see Samuelson (1974). On
the difficulty of inferring market relations from market elasticity
data, see Bishop (1952). At various places in the Realemon transcript,
"the" cross-price elasticity of demand between fresh lemons and
processed lemon juice is referred to. But there are at least eight
ways of defining such an elasticity: one can look at the change in
either the price or quantity demanded of fresh lemons, holding the
other constant, produced by a change in either the price or the
quantity of processed lemon juice, holding the other constant; the
other four definitions are obtained by considering the impact of
changes relating to fresh lemons on processed lemon juice, In
general, no two of these elasticities are equal, and any one of them
(or some other elasticity) could be the most informative in some situation.
32, As Section 2 noted, Golden Crown entered the processed lemon juice
industry without engaging in much market analysis. It thus may not
have known of the difficulties encountered by Sunkist in the 1950's.
Or, if it knew of them, it might have thought that Borden would not
be as tough on it as Realemon-Puritan had apparently been on Sunkist.
As elsewhere in economics, the impossibility of observing expectations
directly is a source of serious problems,
33, Though the Realemon case was brought by the Federal Trade Commission,
it is worth noting that Golden Crown's successor, G,C. Citrus Corpor-
ation, filed a related treble damage suit against Borden, (Proposed
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of Respondent, Borden, Inc.,
dated April 9, 1976, p, 11,)
-76-
34. This argument can be given a cost/benefit gloss as follows. Suppose
that in the sample of cases that can be brought under some predatory
pricing rule, predation is actually present with probability p.
Let there be zero loss if any case is decided correctly, (This
neglects litigation costs,) Suppose that average loss from undetected
predation is I so that if all alegations of predatory pricing were
simply dismissed, the expected total loss would be Mp, Suppose that
the probability of an incorrect decision is e, and let the loss if
relief is imposed when no predation is actually present be C - this
stems from inhibition of competitive conduct, Then it is easy to show
that the expected loss if all cases are litigated exceeds that if all
cases are dismissed if and only if e exceeds 1/{1 + [(l-p)/p][C/M]}.
If p is low, say ,01, and (C/M) is non-trivial, say 0,5, then the
critical value of e can be quite low, .02 in this sample. If error
is more likely, it is better simply to bring no cases.
35. See also Areeda and Turner (1976).
36. On these issues, see also Areeda and Turner (1976), Scherer (1976b),
and Posner (1976, pp. 191-3),
37, Bork (1978, p, 154) stresses the complexities and allocation problems
involved in preparing cost estimates that will stand up in litigation
and argues that "the costs the law uses are only coincidentally related
to real economic cost",
38. Though one can quibble with this cost concept, it does correspond to
the non-economist's notion of average total cost, and I do not think
that there is much to be served by going into detailed analytics here.
-77-
39. For an interesting analysis of entry deterrence in the presence of
"learning-by-doing" in production, see Smiley and Ravid (1978).
40. Data available to me do not permit a definite conclusion on this
point, but it may be worth noting that Golden Crown's shares of
processed lemon juice sales in Buffalo and Philadelphia in 1974,
after the Realemon sales at very low prices discussed in Section 2,
above, were both around 29%. (Brief of Respondent Borden, Inc.,
in Support of its Appeal from the Initial Decision of the Administrative
Law Judge, filed November 15, 1976, p. 35,)
41. One might acquire such a fear by reading Posner (1976, pp. 193-6).
42. Scherer (1976a, p 890),
43. See, for instance, Areeda and Turner (1976). Williamson (1977), and
Bork (1978, pp. 154-5).
44. Scherer (1976b, p. 903), emphasis in original.
45. Initial Decision, pp. 313-4.
46. Initial Decision, pp. 162-3.
47. Initial Decision, p. 164.
48. It suggests, if anything, that Realemon's apparently high profits may
have reflected mainly inappropriate accounting treatment of its adver-
tising. If the "goodwill" for which Borden paid in 1962 was, in fact,
equal to the properly depreciated cost of past advertising, Realemon's
apparent excess profits would largely vanish. Moreover, unless there
were some obstacle preventing Golden Crown and others from advertising
with equal effectiveness, it would be hard to sustain a finding of
substantial barriers to entry; see Schmalensee (1974) on this point.
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49. For a discussion of the ready-to-eat breakfast.cereal industry, see
Schmalensee (1978). It should be clear that the spatial competition
approach used there to model product differentiation would make no
sense in the processed lemon juice industry,
50. For details of this sort of argument in a related context, see
Schmalensee (1974),
51. See Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law of Respondent,
Borden, nc,, dated April 9, 1976, pp, 113-4.
52. Initial Decision, p, 62
53. On the many definitions of "brand loyalty" in various contexts, see
Engle, Kollat, and Blackwell (1973, ch,23) and the references they
cite, In the text, this term is employed in a fashion consistent with
the facts n Realemon; a loyal consumer is willing to pay a premium
price for the favored brand,
54. Taylor (1974) provides an overview of the marketing literature concerned
with the risk-taking dimension of consumer behavior.
55. It ignores the likelihood that habitual purchase of Realemon will be
questioned only if the consumer receives a sufficiently convincing
indication that another brand might be better. That is, it is probably
unrealistic to model consumers, as the foregoing discussion has
implicitly done, as constantly comparing available alternatives on
the margin, abit serves to economize on decision-making time and
effort and, once established, may persist in the absence of strong
stimuli, The risk reduction model also ignores the role that Realemon's
advertising might have played and the possibility that Realemon's
II
-79-
premium price served as an indicator of quality, reinforcing its premium
status, (On this last point, see Engle, Kollat, and Blackwell (1973,
pp. 251-2)and the references they cite.)
56. In Holton's (1970) terms, the problem is the apparent low quality of
consumer demand, It is perhaps worth noting that bottled lemon juice
would seem to possess the characteristics that he argues work
against problems of this sort.
57. Initial Decision, p, 164
58. While trademarks are also important in the ready-to-eat breakfast
cereal industry, a comparison of the analysis here with that in
Schmalensee (1978) should serve to indicate that they play very
different roles in the two industries and that defensible economic
arguments for trademark licensing in the two cases must therefore
differ in basic ways,
59. It is not clear why market share would be an appropriate measure of
size even under models of this sort; surely total assets or total liquid
assets would be more relevant when predation is an issue,
